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The article seeks to promote a scholarly debate between the temporal 
single-system interpretation of Marx and the Value-Form school. 
Since they both recognize the standards required of constructive de-
bate and seek a proper understanding of Marx’s actual theory, such a 
debate promises to be productive. Michael Heinrich’s argument, rep-
resentative of the Value-Form school, is that Marx’s derivation of ab-
stract labor, value, and money is “ambivalent” and should be replaced 
by superior derivations of these categories. I argue that the Value-
Form school’s proposed replacements exhibit a tendency to eliminate 
contradiction from value theory. In particular, the idea that the labor 
in a commodity is abstract only after the commodity is sold gives rise 
to a quietist tendency. It confuses successful sale with the formation 
of a price. This stems from an ambivalence attitude towards general 
equilibrium theory, leading to an underestimation of the devastating 
effect of von Bortkiewicz’s rewriting of Marx. 
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Introduction 
 
This article seeks to promote a scholarly debate between two schools 
of thinking about value. These are the TSSI (temporal single-system 
interpretation) of Marx, and the value-form (VF) school. I will argue 
that there is a mutual recognition of the standards required of       
constructive debate, and that this differentiates both schools from the 
dominant simultaneist 2 paradigm in Marxist scholarship. This prom-
ises that such a debate is not only possible and needed, but can be 
productive. Our shared goal of a proper understanding of Marx’s   
actual theory cannot but lead to progress, and it offers the possibility 
of a timely new stage in the discussion. 
I will address Michael Heinrich’s argument, representative of the 
VF school, that Marx’s derivation of abstract labor, value, and money 
is “ambivalent” and should be replaced by superior derivations of the-
se same categories. I cannot but agree that Marx’s reasoning can be 
improved, since no body of thought is ever complete; however, I am 
less certain that VF authors have improved it  
My argument is that their proposed replacements contain a latent 
tendency to eliminate contradiction from the basic categories of value 
theory. In particular, a core VF idea––that a commodity must be sold 
before the labor in it is recognized as abstract––gives rise to a quietist 
tendency by confusing successful sale with the formation of a price. 
I think this stems from VF’s own ambivalence towards general 
equilibrium (GE) theory in economics, leading to an underestimation 
                                                           
1 London Metropolitan University. e-mail: afreeman@iwgvt.org. 
2 TSSI authors use the neutral term “physicalist” in place of the pejorative epithet 
“neo-ricardian” which rejected by physicalist writers. Our own term derives from 
Steedman’s (1977, 72, 216–17) self-designation. Unless precision is required, I 
use “simultaneist” to stress the derivation of value and price, which are defined as 
the solution to sets of simultaneous equations. Simultaneism is conceptually 
wider than physicalism, including for example Walrasian General Equilibrium. 
The term “temporalism” refers to non-equilibrium approaches, in which 
magnitudes are calculated through difference or differential equations. It should 
be noted that simultaneist categories, unlike temporal categories, are 
ontologically defined by the method of calculation. 
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of the devastating effect of von Bortkiewicz’s rewriting of Marx’s value 
theory within a GE framework. 
GE presupposes that the market perfectly reproduces itself––in 
short, that its object of study is free of contradiction. If imposed on 
the basic categories of the theory––value, labor, money, price––it be-
comes impossible to deduce from that theory those features of capi-
talism which were central to Marx’s purpose: crisis, capitalism’s law 
of motion, and transition. 
GE further engenders an “ontological collapse”: within it, con-
cepts that are distinct in the real world are made mathematically    
indistinguishable (numéraire and money; physical quantity and labor 
time; the different profit rates in physical, value, and price terms; sale 
and price formation; and so on). This creates ambivalences which do 
not exist in the original and can be overcome in a strictly temporal 
derivation, as I will illustrate with reference to the two central catego-
ries of abstract labor and money. 
 
Scholarly Debate: A categorical imperative 
 
This section explains why TSSI and VF approaches to debate            
are compatible, and why such approaches are both possible and    
necessary. 
The TSSI tradition is founded on engagement and pluralism.3 
Briefly speaking, pluralism means considering not just one’s own  
theory, but the alternatives, and engagement means considering  
what a theory actually says, not what an author thinks it says, or 
“would say if corrected” according to her preconceptions.4 In this   
paper, I additionally employ an approach, first defined by Althusser, 
of “symptomatic reading.” Again briefly speaking, the idea is that 
when studying or critiquing a theory, we should not seek immediate 
grounds for accepting or rejecting it, but should first ask “how does 
this theory oblige or enable us to think about the world?” On the basis 
of pluralism, this offers a criterion of judgment between theories: 
which one, including its presuppositions and deductions, provides the 
best account of what we observe? 
My concept of scholarly debate is, in summary, an attempt to    
uncover the presuppositions which each of our theories make, and the 
conclusions that follow from them. That is how I intend to approach 
VF writings. 
Scholarly debate is an essential antidote to the rhetorical strategy 
                                                           
3 Each, engagement and pluralism, is informed by the guidelines in the editorial 
mission statement of COPE at www.copejournal.org  
4 See, for example, Kliman and Freeman (2006).  
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adopted by Steedman (1979, 1981) and accepted by all simultaneist 
writers––who dominate post-Sraffian Marx scholarship––whether 
supportive or dismissive of Marx’s theories. Steedman sets out a ver-
sion of “Marx’s theory” derived from von Bortkiewicz’s  (1952) recon-
struction of this theory in GE terms. Irresolvable inconsistencies 
arise,5 from which Steedman concludes that “Marx’s theory” should 
be dismissed. The error, however, lies in von Bortkiewicz’s interpreta-
tion and not Marx’s reasoning, which can be rendered fully consistent 
in a temporal framework.  
This strategy has eliminated from contention one of the few     
economic theories that furnish viable explanations of empirical      
reality, by misrepresenting the original ideas within it to the point 
where they are no longer accessible to the public. These ideas and 
concepts must be recovered if informed judgments are to be made. 
Where do VF writers stand on this matter? True, they are silent 
on whether Marx is a simultaneist, but any objective reading shows 
that they do not employ the simultaneist rhetorical strategy. They 
recognize the importance of interpretation based on evidence. They 
distinguish their own views from Marx’s, and seek accurately to     
ascertain Marx’s own views. All this is evident in Heinrich’s (1999) 
book, Die Wissenschaft vom Wert (Science of Value): 6 
 
The opening up and systematisation of Marx’s texts … presupposes  
a unified and correct discourse, which is confined to laying bare      
or even “reconstructing’, and which is clearly differentiated from 
vulgarisation and false interpretation.  
In question are only Marx’s explicit methods and his under-
standing of his object [gegenstandsverständnis] and not the theo-
retical coherence of his discourse. [Heinrich 1999, 10, emphases in 
original] 
 
This is very far from the post-Sraffian approach to debate. Clear 
common ground thus exists between TSSI and VF on how to conduct 
debate about Marx’s theory: the enquiry begins by identifying what 
this theory really says. 
 
                                                           
5 The most notable of these are the so-called transformation problem and       
Okishio’s  alleged  refutation  of  Marx’s  tendential  law  of  the  rate  of  profit  to 
fall. See Kliman (2007) for the most complete and recent presentation and 
refutation of the arguments involved. 
6 Unfortunately, this work appears not to have been translated. The translation is 
mine. Apologies for any inaccuracies. 
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Where We Differ 
 
Differences of method do exist. The purpose of this section is to      
establish their defining features.  
Both schools agree that, faced with interpretative difficulties, 
there are objective, evidence-based criteria for deciding what is a   
valid interpretation. In other words, we may not agree about what 
Marx really said, but we agree that there is a way of finding out. There 
is less agreement on the criteria to be used. Kliman’s (2007, Chap. 4)       
hermeneutic criterion is that of Stigler: faced with two interpretations 
of a text, one chooses that which best permits the text’s conclusions to 
be deduced from its premises. Heinrich (1999), in keeping with     
German Marx scholarship, focuses on the “ambivalences” in Marx’s 
categories, presented as the unresolved outcomes of a process of    
research in which the object of study consists of successive 
reworkings of the text. Heinrich’s third section is entitled “The Am-
bivalence of the Foundation Categories of the Critique of Political 
Economy,” and in it he introduces this concern: “To approach sur-
mounting the … difficulties in Marx’s theory of money and credit, be-
fore identifying the elements of these two discourses, it is above all 
necessary to overcome ambivalences in the central categories, and 
distinguish real problems from apparent ones” (Heinrich 1999, 17). 
TSSI authors do not find the ambivalences in Marx that VF        
authors claim to identify. I want to convince both my TSSI colleagues, 
and my VF co-contributor, that this is not an obstacle to the debate, 
but its subject. 
Ambivalence, unlike inconsistency, is not a reason to reject a   
theory. It simply means that we are not clear about what the theory 
really says, because its concepts have two potential meanings.       
Supposing that an impartial reader were convinced that there are 
ambivalences in Marx’s categories. Would this reader then have to 
reject the TSSI argument? I do not think so. On the other hand,     
suppose that this reader is convinced that all supposed ambivalences 
have been resolved by the TSSI approach. Would this reader have to 
conclude that value-form analysis was false? Again, I think not. 
However, VF authors do need to addresss their own ambivalence 
about whether Marx has actually been proven inconsistent. It would 
aid the debate if they addressed TSSI proofs of consistency. Is the  
motivation for wanting to improve on Marx simply that something 
better is available, or––as maintained by the simultaneists––that 
Marx’s own reasoning does not in fact work? 
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To sum up: the differences between the VF and TSSI approach-  
es are not obstacles to debate, but its subject. The central issue           
to explore is this: are the categories of value theory, as inherited   
from Marx, ambivalent; and, if so, from where does this ambiva- 
lence arise? 
 
 
Contradiction and Basic Categories 
 
This section introduces the fundamental logical problem around 
which this article turns: it is essential, when constructing any basic 
category, not to introduce any presuppositions which assume away 
contradiction.  
VF authors are centrally concerned with the derivation of Marx’s 
basic or, as Heinrich terms them, foundational categories––abstract  
labor, use-value, exchange-value, money, price, circulation, produc-
tion, and profit. They want to establish the ontological status of the 
objects to which the theory refers.  
TSSI authors agree, adding that if the basic categories exclude 
contradiction, the resulting theory will be unable to describe capital-
ism as it actually exists. I will illustrate this in relation to the         
most well-known contradictory feature of the capitalist economy––
economic crisis.  
Contradiction is the most basic feature of reality. As Hegel (1989, 
439, emphasis in original) notes, “as against contradiction, identity is 
merely the determination of the simple immediate, dead being; but 
contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so 
far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an 
urge and vitality.”  
Capitalism, like all reality, contains contradictions within it. As we 
will show, it requires these contradictions in order to exist. We will 
therefore not be able to analyze capitalism if we begin by assuming 
them away. We may get an internally perfect theory––the theory of 
divine creation is, in its own way, perfect––but it will not and cannot 
apply empirically to the world we live in,7 because that world really 
does contain the contradiction that the theory has dispensed with. 
                                                           
7 I am not arguing that a theory has to be inconsistent in order to be true. The 
point is more complex: if a theory assumes away contradictions that really exist, 
then it cannot apply to reality. Once abolished from the theory’s categories, these 
contradictions cannot “re-enter” the theory by the back door after it has been 
constructed. This gives rise to one of the oldest problems in religion, namely, if 
the universe is created by a being that incarnates perfection and can do no wrong, 
how come it contains wrong things? 
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This has implications for three aspects of capitalism which were 
central to Marx’s contribution: the origin of capitalism, the notion of 
its “laws of motion,” and the theory of capitalist crisis. This paper fo-
cuses on the first of these. 
Is crisis an accident, an imposition from outside capitalism, an 
outcome of bad management or misfortune? Or is it, as for Marx, an 
intrinsic feature of capitalism? 
Capitalism and the market do not reproduce themselves perfectly. 
They reproduce the most abstract conditions of their existence, such 
as the survival of both major classes and the departments of produc-
tion that supply them. But the concrete manifestation of this abstract 
self-identity is immensely variable. Society never reproduces itself in 
the detail presupposed by GE, not even from one moment to the next. 
Goods are produced but not sold, investments are made but not used, 
money is lent but not returned, enterprises are founded and go bank-
rupt. The price and quantities of any given commodity produced, 
consumed, or awaiting sale vary, contingently and incessantly. Not 
least, innovation brings about a constant secular change not merely in 
the prices and values of all goods but in the composition of output. 
This fact is neither discountable or ignorable. Capitalism requires 
these discrepancies in order to reproduce itself. To be very precise, it 
reproduces abstractly by failing to reproduce concretely.8 It is only 
because its details are not reproduced that, as a whole, it is repro-
duced. It is because excess demand and supply appear, because prices 
respond to that by rising and falling, and because the rate of profit is 
therefore everywhere either above, or below, the average, that capital, 
moving in pursuit of surplus profit, flows out of the overproducing 
and into the underproducing sectors, maintaining the system as a 
whole in existence. In this very profound dialectical sense, the capital-
ist economy is the contradictory unity of reproduction and non-
reproduction, and any attempt to wish this contradiction away is 
doomed to remain “aloof from the sphere of being and truth,” to lose 
sight of the source of movement of capitalism, and fail to explain what 
we see before our eyes. 
Nor are these discrepancies numerically minor or qualitatively  
insignificant. At definite and repeated moments, large masses of capi-
tal are not just affected but liquidated––think Enron, think Argentina 
2002 or, if inclined to catastrophism, 1929. Such crises are not, as 
Marx puts it, a “defect” that can be set aside with due care and man-
agement. They are functional and indispensable. They restore, by 
means of “creative destruction,” imbalances which would otherwise 
                                                           
8 To put it another way, it constantly redefines its abstract nature––as does every 
organic thing. 
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overturn the system. Eliminate them from your thinking, and you will 
cease to understand the system. 
These tendencies are also of historical significance. In the very 
large movements assessed by Schumpeter and others, they periodical-
ly redefine and reconstruct the national territorial structure of the 
world. Their byproducts are war, racism, Islamophobia, ecological 
catastrophe, and economic genocide.  
In summary, failures of reproduction––and circulation––are not 
superficial or external impositions on the capitalist system. They are 
part of what that system is. The real, Heraclitean problem is not “how 
does capitalism go wrong, assuming that it always succeeds” but “how 
does capitalism succeed, given that it incessantly goes wrong.” 
 
The Assumption of Reproduction 
 
This leads us to a crucial danger which VF authors seem to ignore 
when deriving the basic categories of money and labor: if, in the deri-
vation, we presuppose that capitalism “works,” then those categories 
will not apply to any situation in which capitalism does not “work”––
for example if goods are left unsold. Since such interruptions happen 
all the time, these categories will not be applicable to capitalism as it 
really exists. Most important, it will turn out to be impossible to     
deduce or explain crisis on the basis of these categories. 
Once the basic categories are in place, one may of course consider 
particular, pure forms as a special case in order to focus attention on 
them. Hence, once Marx has constructed the category of value, he can 
consider the conditions for balanced reproduction in Volume 2, can 
study rent in Volume 3 by supposing that all landownership is capital-
ist, and indeed can deduce surplus value under the restricted assump-
tion of exchange at prices equal to values, having shown in Chapter 5 
of Volume 1 that no surplus can result from exchange at prices differ-
ent from values. 
If, however, these same restrictive presuppositions are applied to 
the basic categories themselves, they cease to be a special case and 
instead become a part of the definition.  
This lies at the root of the failure of the simultaneist interpreters 
of Marx’s own categories. Von Bortkiewicz reconstructed Marx as a 
variant of GE. This reconstruction shares all the defects of GE, 
starting with the most central––it eliminates contradiction. 
Why did Marx put Volume 2 after Volume 1? If reproduction were 
presupposed in order to deduce the categories of value, price, ex-
change, etc., then reproduction would be a more basic category, and 
should be analyzed first: Volume 2 ought logically to come first. Given 
the attention that VF authors pay to the ordering of the texts in 
Marx’s writing, this should surely be clear––as it should be clear that 
9 
any interpretation of Marx which assumes reproduction in order to 
deduce value cannot possibly be compatible with Marx’s actual       
textual ordering.  
Marx’s ordering––first the basic categories and then reproduc-
tion––corresponds to logical necessity. Before studying how, whether, 
and under what circumstances, capitalism reproduces itself through 
the production and exchange of value, he first establishes what these 
things themselves are. All simultaneist or GE schemata begin by    
assuming that society reproduces itself perfectly. They then ask, 
“what must production, circulation and exchange be like, in order 
that this reproduction is possible?” They write down a set of simulta-
neous equations expressing this condition, and solve them to yield 
prices or values. 
This is not just a calculation; it is an ontology. It defines these cat-
egories to be that which will reproduce the system––that is, it logically 
deduces them from reproduction. Indeed, the definition does not 
even exist if supply and demand do not equalize at all times every-
where. The equations are then simply indeterminate. 
This has three consequences. First, there is a basic paradox. In 
order to study how capitalism reproduces itself, the approach elimi-
nates the mechanism by which it does so.9 Second, no theory can em-
ploy such a category to study “out-of-equilibrium” behavior, because, 
by definition, the category does not apply to such situations. Crisis is 
then excluded by assumption. Having been excluded, it cannot be  
reintroduced. In GE theories, crisis is always exogenous. It is               
a product of bad government, poor monetary management, trade      
unions, market distortions, communism, Islam––anything and every-
thing is demonized except the market itself. This is not a superficial 
ideological distortion, but is buried deep within the theory itself. It is 
logically impossible to deduce any failure to reproduce from the 
working of the market itself. 
Third, and critically for any research into the real source of       
ambivalences, the construction gives rise to something which, with    
a more than cursory deference to Schrödinger, I term “ontological 
collapse.” It obliterates all ontological distinctions which only exist as 
a result of a failure of reproduction. Thus, for example, it obliterates 
the distinction between sale and price formation, which I deal with 
shortly. If everything is sold, then the price of everything is simply the 
price it sells for. The very possibility that it could sell for less, or more, 
or not at all, is excluded. More profoundly, the GE construction elim-
inates the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, which is 
why Steedman successfully skewers all his opponents with the correct 
                                                           
9 See Freeman (1998) for a fuller discussion of this question. 
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charge that (in von Bortkiewicz’s system, but not in Marx’s) value is 
redundant. Signally important for VF authors, the construction oblit-
erates the distinction between money as money of account and money 
as means of payment or store of value, reducing all to a simple 
numéraire. And not least, it eliminates the vital distinction between 
the physical rate of profit, the value rate of profit, and the price rate 
of profit––from which it deduces a conclusion in conflict with all hu-
man experience, that the rate of profit cannot possibly fall whilst 
productivity is rising, and proclaims it as an  immense theoretical ad-
vance. 
It is this ontological collapse, I will argue, which comprises        
the real source of the ambivalences perceived by VF authors, which 
are in reality a product of their own ambivalence in the face of the    
GE paradigm. 
 
A Fatal Ambivalence: Value-form and general  
equilibrium 
 
Apparently alone among VF writers, Heinrich does critique general 
equilibrium. But in my opinion, his critique contains a fatal omission: 
he confines it to the conceptual basis of methodological individual-
ism, in effect identifying it with marginalism. He writes: 
 
With [equilibrium-based––AF] neoclassical economics, it is true, a 
new problematic for economic theory emerges. however it remained 
within the same theoretical field from which the problematic of  
classical economics was constructed. Marginalism, like classical  
economics, presupposes a definite human essence (Wesen des   
Menschen) … . 
As in classical theory, humans are completely non-social. The 
single Atomised individual is counterposed to nature. Starting from 
this isolated individual, economic relations are constructed through 
the maximising behaviour of these individuals. Exchange, in neo-
classical as in classical theory, is not seen as the form in which social 
relationships are mediated, but simply as an act between two indi-
vidual commodity owners. [Heinrich 1999, 77, emphases in original] 
 
However, first of all, GE is not identical to marginalism. The GE 
“revolution” supplanted the original marginalism of the Austrian 
school which to this day vehemently rejects it. The advent of GE, 
which in truth dates from Marshall’s rescuing of Walras from obscuri-
ty, played a far more sweeping role than merely legitimizing margin-
alism: it reconstructed all economics as a theological doctrine without 
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contradiction.10  It did this to every branch of economic theory includ-
ing Marx’s, converting them from their previous either scientific or 
merely vulgar form into a mathematically rigorous apologetic system. 
Von Bortkiewicz was completely conscious of the generic charac-
ter of GE. Having corresponded with Walras as an admirer since the 
age of 19, he set out explicitly to reconstruct Marx’s value theory as a 
variant of GE: 
 
Alfred Marshall said once of Ricardo: ‘He does not state clearly, and 
in some cases he perhaps did not fully and clearly perceive how, in 
the problem of normal value, the various elements govern one       
another mutually, not successively, in a long chain of causation’. 
This description applies even more to Marx … [who] held firmly to 
the view that the elements concerned must be regarded as a kind of 
causal chain, in which each link is determined, in its composition 
and its magnitude, only by the preceding links … Modern economics 
is beginning to free itself gradually from the successivist prejudice, 
the chief merit being due to the mathematical school led by Léon 
Walras. [Bortkiewicz 1952, 23–24, emphases in original] 
 
Heinrich’s enumeration of the textual sequence of the evolution of 
Marx’s thinking omits the one text that everyone actually now reads. 
This was not written by Marx. It was written by von Bortkiewicz. I do 
not think it is possible for the VF project itself to progress without 
engaging with this fact. One cannot ascertain where Marx’s ambiva-
lences actually lie, until one first tests whether these are resolvable 
within the temporal theory he actually held (as von Bortkiewicz here 
acknowledges), and not the GE theory foisted on him. 
Nor do I think it possible to improve or advance on value theory 
or indeed, on economic theory as a whole, other than on a rigorously 
temporal basis. This brings me to the vexed and central question of 
the relation between abstract labor and price. 
 
 
Abstract Labor and Price 
 
At root, crisis is a generic failure, a suspension of reproduction. It 
is the generalization of a specific type of event, namely, a failure to 
sell. It is therefore exceptionally dangerous to construct any basic cat-
egory on the assumption of successful sale. 
This takes us to the heart of the VF construction, which hinges on 
the view that in order to be “recognized” as abstract, labor must      
                                                           
10 See Freeman (2007) for a fuller discussion of this question 
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participate in sale. Taken literally, this implies that labor can only be 
abstract if capitalism succeeds. 
In this section I show how this affects the definition of abstract 
labor, and how the category is derived. I will first show that the VF 
approach involves a crucial confusion between the formation of a 
price and the successful completion of sale. I will then argue that   
labor becomes abstract not when a commodity is sold, but when its 
price is formed. I will exhibit an consistent definition of abstract labor 
on this basis which resolves the ambivalence perceived by VF authors. 
 
When Does a Price Exist? 
 
Heinrich begins from a standpoint with which I agree. He writes,  
 
The object of Marx’s enquiry is thus not simply the commodity, but 
the commodity as the social form of the product of labour, and that 
which is social about the commodity is its “value.” The problem 
which Marx then poses does not consist in “proving” that labour is 
the substance of value, but in reconstructing, from this social form 
of the product of labour, the specifically social form of labour. 
[Heinrich 1999, 204, emphases in original] 
 
This is a clear framework: Marx’s categories are the social expression 
of a specific stage and form of society, the capitalist mode of   produc-
tion. The problem is therefore to understand abstract labor as the ex-
pression of social labor organized to produce socially-defined com-
modities for sale. I have no disagreement with this; it is the     
conclusion which is drawn from it that determines the terrain of dis-
cussion:  
 
There is a decisive structural difference between commodity produc-
tion and the various forms of communal [gemeinschaftlich] produc-
tion. Whilst in commodity production, labour is privately expended 
and receives its social [gesellschaftlich] character, its recognition as 
part of social labour, subsequently [nachträglich], in exchange, in 
communal production the “social character of production is presup-
posed.” [Heinrich 1999, 204, emphases in original]11 
 
The key word here is “subsequently.” The implication––more   
ambivalent in some VF texts than others––is that a commodity must 
be sold to qualify the labor in it as abstract. If I have read this wrong, 
I am happy to stand corrected, since it will show there is greater 
agreement than I believed. 
                                                           
11 The phrase inside quotations marks is Marx’s. 
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Being sold is not the same as having a price. A commodity is sold 
when it changes hands. But all commodities have a price long before 
changing hands and indeed, a commodity cannot be sold until it has a 
price, otherwise, the parties to exchange do not know how much 
money to hand over. The focus ought to be, therefore, not on how or 
whether a commodity gets sold, but on how and when it acquires a 
price. 
A commodity has a price at all stages of its existence, including 
immediately as it emerges from production––and in fact this was 
Marx’s (1976a, 260) view: “This situation is not altered by placing 
money, as a medium of circulation, between the commodities, and 
making the sale and purchase into two physically distinct acts. The 
value of a commodity is expressed in its price before it enters into  
circulation, and it is therefore a pre-condition of circulation, not       
its result.” 
This price of a commodity can and of course does change over 
time. But it exists, as the monetary equivalent of the use-value con-
cerned, for the entire time that use-values of this type exist. Sale at a 
given price is logically distinct from when the price is formed. In the 
next section, we discuss how and when this occurs. 
 
Social Commodities vs. Individual Sale 
 
The requirement that “a commodity” should be sold before the labor 
in it becomes social bypasses a prior issue: the commodity itself is 
social. Once we speak of “a commodity” being sold, we must be speak-
ing of one particular commodity, namely, the one that is sold. But sale 
is an individual act. So we are speaking of one particular commodity-
owner––the seller––and one particular buyer. This is clear from the 
positions of the Uno school, as outlined (and criticized) by Chris    
Arthur (2006). He cites Itoh as follows: 
 
The Uno school criticizes this expanded form. In Marx’s example, 
the commodity A is ‘20 yards of linen’; it is this commodity whose 
value is first expressed in ‘1 coat’, and subsequently in definite 
amounts of other commodities, all equivalents of each other as the 
value of that same twenty yards of linen. 
By contrast, Uno and his followers argue that the amounts of 
linen specified should vary on each occasion, because it has to be the 
value equivalent of the specific amount of each other commodity   
desired by the linen owner. [Arthur 2006, 14] 
 
The Uno school thus requires that the circumstances of exchange 
should vary on the occasion of each sale. But this leads immed-      
iately back to the “anthropological-individualist” defects that Hein-
14 
rich enjoins us to avoid. We are no longer discussing the general    
social characteristics of the community of linen-owners but one    
particular linen-owner with one particular set of “specific amounts” 
desired in exchange. The social character of the linen-owner has   
simply vanished. She now stands as an individual in the marketplace 
with her individual wants and needs as the prime starting point of 
value determination. 
The missing point is that a commodity––for example, a sock––is 
also “social,” along with the labor that produced it. It is one of a     
general type. As Marx (1976a: 57) puts it, “All the linen in the market 
counts but as one article of commerce, of which each piece is only an 
aliquot part.” There are, out there in the world, literally billions of 
socks. For any one sock, a million other indistinguishable socks exist. 
It is not necessary for any particular sock to sell, for the social catego-
ry of “sock” to exist. The use-value of the sock, just like its exchange-
value, is not a property of one sock.12 
For the same reason, whether or not the individual coat-owner 
wishes to exchange the commodity linen for 20, 10, or 10,000 yards 
of linen is immaterial. Society determines the proportions in which 
commodities generally exchange, abstracting from the individual 
characteristics of producers and purchasers alike––as is evident from 
the fact that no matter how much linen we may want for a coat, we 
will not find anyone to give it us at anything significantly far away 
from the socially established, average market price. 
Abstract labor arises not because society distinguishes one sock or 
sock seller from another, but because it distinguishes sock-ness in 
general from other use-values in general––linen-ness, coat-ness,    
bible-ness, and so on––establishing a (time-varying) average ratio of 
exchange between them.13  The labor involved in each commodity type 
is distinct (“concrete”), whereas the labor which forms the substance 
of value is abstract, undifferentiated by the type of use-value it       
produces. This abstraction, however, refers to socially-defined generic 
use-values, not to individual vendors and purchasers. The require-
ment that a commodity must be “sold” before its value or price are 
quantitatively definite, because this value or price is allegedly specific 
to an individual act of exchange, obliterates this vital distinction. 
 
 
                                                           
12 Curiously enough, this is a major problem in quantum physics. See Bell (1981). 
13 This ratio, incidentally, does not cease to be their ratio of exchange merely 
because money intermediates the exchange. 
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When is a Price Not a Price?: The temporal character of 
price and value formation 
 
We now turn to the category of price. For the same reason that          
all use-values are social, all the ratios in Marx’s derivation are     
themselves average, social magnitudes. Consequently, the “price” of a 
commodity is itself social.  
This introduces a further and rather important issue. The price of 
a commodity is not the price of an individual, particular commodity 
but of the average of its type, just as the commodity itself is the       
abstract representative of its use-value. “Socks” are bought and sold 
all the time. At any moment in time, the “price of a sock” is a socially-
known magnitude, even if it exists as an average of a distribution. It is 
what you see on the price tag when you walk into a sock shop. This is 
the “price of socks.” 
The sock producer does not even know whether a particular    
sock sells or not. She does not stand at a counter or in some idealized 
marketplace, waiting for a buyer for every sock she makes. She works 
in a sock factory and, as soon as the sock leaves the production line, 
any remaining individual relation between the sock and its maker 
ceased to exist. The sock goes into a general stock of socks, some in 
the warehouse, some in transit, some in shops, some in shopping bags 
and, to the extent that there is a secondhand market in socks, in  
charity shops. The sock receives its social characteristics––and in   
particular its exchange-value––from its status as part of this general 
stock. 
It is perfectly true that the labor in the sock is abstract only 
through comparison in exchange between sock-ness and all other use-
values. But this comparison is made the moment the sock has a price, 
and it is the existence of these socially-defined prices which recogniz-
es the concrete labor in it as abstract. There is no need to wait for the 
sock to be sold before this occurs. Each concrete labor enters compar-
ison with every other via the mediation of price, not via the mediation 
of sale. 
There is therefore, also, no especial difficulty in measuring the 
quantity of abstract labor in a commodity at any given moment of 
time. Once produced, the sock enters the general pool of commodities 
of that same type. The quantity of abstract labor in any individual 
sock is then the simple average of the labor historically bestowed      
on all socks awaiting sale, just as the price is the simple average         
of their money price: “The price of the individual article then 
=
the total price of the product
the total number of products , the total price divided by the total 
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number of products as measured in the various units of measure,    
depending on the use-value of the product” (Marx 1976b, 969). 
The above is a temporal definition of both the concept, and the 
magnitude, of value. By this I mean that the future plays no role in 
the definition. If the world ended tomorrow, so that no commodity 
now would ever be sold from midnight UCT today, nevertheless 
everything produced for sale up until 23:59:59 UCT would be a 
commodity at that time. The future sets no precondition on either the 
definition or the magnitude of value, which depend only on past 
history––including, incidentally, the past history of all values and 
prices. 
This is not to underestimate the non-trivial problem of account-
ing, in value terms, for a mismatch between supply and demand. On 
this there is room for a valid and productive discussion. I offer only 
one approach, my own––though I think it is also to be found in Marx 
––which requires the recognition of stocks. It was laid out in Freeman 
(1996) and is based on the account of the formation of socially-
determined demand and socially-determined supply in Chap. 10 of 
Capital, Vol. 3 (Marx 1981, 273) .  
A mismatch between demand and supply manifests itself as a rise 
or diminution of stock. If socially-formed supply exceeds socially 
formed demand over a given period of time, this will give rise to an 
increase in inventories; conversely, an excess of demand over supply 
will give rise to a decrease in inventories. This incidentally leads to a 
fall or rise of the market prices below, or above, the value of the 
commodity, but this does not affect the value until and unless it 
brings about the entry into, or exit from, the market of producers at 
the top or bottom end of the range of productive efficiencies involved 
in making that commodity. 
Calculating the commodity’s value then proceeds as follows:     
suppose that, at any given time t, an amount tx  of the commodity’s 
use-value exists, in the form of stocks having a value tv , measured in 
labor-hours. The commodity’s unit value is of course t
t
v
x
. 
A temporal definition of value specifies how, given this initial 
condition, to determine the unit value at a subsequent time t+ t∆ . 
This is given in the following manner: suppose that, over the period 
t∆ , x∆  new units of the commodity are produced by means of v∆  
hours of labor. The stock of use values has now increased to  
 
 1t t tx x x+ = + ∆  (1) 
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and the labor embodied in this stock to  
  
 1t t tv v v+ = + ∆  (2) 
 
and the new unit value is  
 
 
tt
tt
t
t
x
vv
x
v
∆+
∆+
=
+
+
1
1  (3) 
 
As t∆  tends to zero, we can obtain from the above an expression 
for the rate, at any time, that the value of the commodity is changing, 
leading to a set of completely general differential equations describing 
the “law of motion” of the economy, and fully specifying value at any 
given time. 
A complication arises because some of the commodity is con- 
sumed while production is in process, but this is simple to deal with: 
see, again, Freeman (1996). 
This is fully determinate and unambiguous. It places no precondi-
tion regarding interruption or not of reproduction, and it provides an 
ontologically, and quantitatively, valid basis for theories which can 
account for and encompass all states and trajectories of capitalist 
production and circulation, most importantly those which include 
interruptions of circulation. Discussion may lead to a different        
approach or a modification of this one, but the crucial point is that it 
exhibits an unambivalent and consistent temporal definition of value, 
in which the magnitude of value is directly determined by the time of 
labor, demonstrating that there is no obstacle to an unambivalent  
interpretation of Marx’s own conception of abstract labor, and with-
out modifying his derivation of categories. 
 
Money and general equilibrium 
 
I conclude on a more optimistic note by addressing a category on 
which I think there is more agreement, namely money. My purpose is 
to demonstrate the same general point, however, around which this 
article is organized: VF will greatly benefit from a clear understanding 
of the distortions introduced by GE, and it needs clearly to distinguish 
these from the putative or alleged ambivalences in Marx. 
VF authors have rightly insisted that money cannot be reduced to 
a veil, or to mere money of account. Money is a real thing. Periodic 
business crises are only possible because of it, as Marx noted. They 
are also an inevitable consequence of money. As soon as sale and  
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purchase are regularly intermediated by money, it becomes possible 
for people to sell without buying, thereby interrupting circulation 
and, hence, reproduction. For precisely this reason, Marx’s writings 
are peppered with virulent denunciations of Say’s Law and Ricardo’s 
ambivalent relation to it. 
On this there is no difference at all between VF and TSSI authors. 
For example, Chris Arthur (2005, 111) writes, “A value form approach 
to money shows that money is no mere ‘veil’ of the ‘real’ material con-
tent of economic relations; it is   ‘of the essence’ of value relations; not 
merely the shape in which an underlying matter is expressed.” 
There is a strong measure of agreement, as can be seen from a  
defining contribution of Ramos and Rodriguez (1996, 51, emphases  
in original) to the earliest collection of TSSI writings, in which they 
write: 
 
It is usual to define erroneously value as ‘labour’, that is, to reduce 
value to its substance. Actually, value is a complex concept: value is 
the unity of abstract labour (its substance) and money (its form) 
and, thus, it has an immanent or intrinsic measure (socially          
necessary labour time) and an extrinsic measure (exchange value    
or price). 
In capitalist society, labour is realised as social labour under the 
form of money. Marx always refers to value as a quantity of money 
because ‘[m]oney as a measure of value is the necessary form of    
appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in commodi-
ties, namely labour time.’ (Marx 1976a: 188) 
Measuring value in labour time units shows a misunderstanding 
of the ‘internal, necessary connection between the form of value, the 
substance of value and the magnitude of value.’ 
 
No disagreement, then, that money is not a veil. The question is: 
who says it is? Arthur locates the problem in the dialectical ordering 
of the deduction of the categories of labor and money within Marx. 
But there is significant semantic confusion in his sentence, which 
counterposes veil to essence. 
This is in line with what I take to be his general ontological en-
deavor; he seeks to show that the form of appearance of value––
money––may by some process of ratiocination be conceived as its   
essence. 
That may be as it may be; space does not allow me to enter into 
this discussion. However, it has nothing to do with whether money is 
or is not a veil. A veil is not the shape in which an underlying matter 
is expressed. It is a disguise of this underlying matter. A veil conceals, 
a form of appearance reveals. It seems to me entirely misconceived, 
philosophically, to counterpose veil to essence. 
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The real issue is that money is a thing in its own right. People, 
having obtained money, hold onto it instead of spending it, and this is 
the origin of crisis. On this there is unaccessed common ground, not 
merely between TSSI and VF traditions, but also between the Marxist, 
Keynesian, and even Austrian traditions. GE has destroyed all this   
philosophical commonality: the real problem is to rëestablish it. Let 
us all agree that money has an essence, that there is a substance of 
money, and let us then discuss what this substance is. 
In my opinion, VF authors have made a signal and brave contri-
bution in insisting on this point, which TSSI authors should recog-
nize. The problem is, however, to establish the “theoretical field”––as 
Heinrich would have it––to which the conception of money as veil  
belongs. Is it the field of the common ground of the classical and neo-
classical paradigm as Heinrich asserts––or is it, as I believe, the field 
of general equilibrium? 
Heinrich (1999, 70, emphasis in original) himself notes that the 
insubstantiality of money is a mathematical consequence of general 
equilibrium: 
 
For this equilibrium price, money plays no systematic role. This is 
essentially a system of relative prices, which becomes a system of 
absolute prices only through money … in order to pass from relative 
to absolute prices, an “economic magnitude” (for example a single 
commodity or basket of commodities) an arbitrary quantity [has     
to be] assigned, which Schumpeter terms the “critical figure.” 
Money, induced through such absurd adaptations, is a disturbance 
factor in an otherwise perfect economy … . The complicated equilib-
rium model shows itself to be, in essence, no more than a Barter 
system. 
 
Moreover, unless equilibrium is supposed, it is actually impossi-
ble to treat money as a mere accounting standard. If one does not    
suppose equilibrium, one introduces the possibility that agents may 
hold onto money without purchasing; the thing that they hold onto 
must therefore be deduced in such a way as to demonstrate its        
real existence.  
In short, the notion that money is a veil is logically identical to  
the notion of general equilibrium and perfect reproduction. Within 
economic theory, it arises here, and only here. VF authors have failed 
to notice that exactly the same considerations apply to the standard 
von Bortkiewicz interpretation of Marx, which is no more nor less 
than Marx rewritten as a GE theorist. 
If one has an equilibrium interpretation of Marx, then in           
that system money will be a veil; if, on the other hand, one has a              
non-equilibrium––that is, temporal––interpretation of Marx, money 
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will not be a veil. There are no other logical possibilities. The case, 
therefore, for joint discussion of the temporal definition of money, as 
a necessary logical concomitant of the temporal definition of abstract 
labor, is overwhelming. 
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